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IDENTITY, MODERNITY AND THE CLAIM
TO KNOW BETTER: POST-COLONIAL
TRAGEDY FROM A COSMOPOLITAN
POINT OF VIEW
J O H N DUNN

In the world today cultures c o n f r o n t one a n o t h e r m o r e
explicitly and more painfully than they have ever d o n e before in
h u m a n history. They do so for the most part not in the modes of
invasion and subjugation so common in the past: not t h r o u g h the
direct application of physical violence, but through the subtler
and more elusive dynamics of an interchange which, in appearance, may well be confined to purely cultural terms. T h e union of
cultural destruction with physical coercion does, of course, still
figure in m o d e r n history, sometimes, like in Tibet, or perhaps
Afghanistan, t h r o u g h the mechanics of territorial conquest,
sometimes through the incorporation of more marginal peoples,
like t h e M o n t a g n a r d tribes of V i e t n a m or the K u n g San
Bushmen, into the pitiless routines of m o d e r n wars of decolonization, sometimes, still more wretchedly, with the weakest of modern peoples, as in the Amazonian jungles, through the steady
erosion of their habitat or t h r o u g h genocide itself. Much m o d e r n
historical agency remains intractably criminal, as it has been ever
since h u m a n history began. But for most T h i r d World societies
today, the deepest fear about their present and f uture is not a fear
of invasion or recolonization by West or East or even by one
another, but the nagging suspicion that cultural confrontation
itself, within the economic and political ecology of the m o d e r n
world, will necessarily and uncontrollably maim their identity as
societies. This is not a foolish or superficial anxiety, however
paranoid or ludicrous the expressions which it may sometimes
receive.
What I would like to do in this lecture is to consider very briefly
the rationale of this fear and then to ask what implications this
rationale may have for the attempt to u n d e r s t a n d the political
1
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history of the m o d e r n world in terms which are not parochial to
some particular component area within it. T o dramatize this
question I shall discuss at some length the political experience of a
single country, Ghana, which has suffered direly f r o m the glibness of m o d e r n political understanding. I pick this country partly
for the trivial motive that I h a p p e n to know something about it,
but more importantly because of the scale of h u m a n tragedy
which it represents and because of the very limited understanding of the causation of this tragedy which either Ghanaians or
foreign interpreters have managed to piece together. T h e purpose which I have in mind in considering these two questions
together is to press the issue of how far an understanding of
m o d e r n history can be genuinely cosmopolitan in content and
how far an apparently cosmopolitan style of u n d e r s t a n d i n g
(which is as available to the Soviet Union or the People's Republic
of China as it is to France or the United States of America) must
represent simply the decking of a parochial and ethnocentric
vision in a spuriously oecumenical guise. Both cosmopolis and
oikoumene, of course, are Greek words; and the suspicion readily
arises that the leading candidate for a genuinely cosmopolitan
vision may well prove to be simply the vision we ourselves h a p p e n
to enjoy. But agreeable though it would be to be entitled to equate
o u r own point of view with, in Henry Sidgwick's memorably
absurd phrase, "the point of view of the universe," such an equation is a little too good to be even plausible and a lot too comforting to r u n any risk of being true.
For a perspective to be genuinely cosmopolitan it would certainly have to be accessible in principle to some of us (however
protracted the passage of cultural reconsideration which might
prove necessary for us to attain it in practice). But it would also
have to be accessible in principle to at least some of the denizens of
all other h u m a n cultures extant today (if perhaps in some cases
after even longer travails of cultural reconsideration). And, f r o m
o u r point of view more urgently, it would also have to be a point of
view which in no way privileged the purely historical contingencies of o u r own identities. We may enjoy (and thus far in fact we
have enjoyed) some measure of real historical privilege. But we
cannot simply be cultural privilege incarnate: Nature's—and History's Chosen People. Cultural relativity, the all too evident truth
that the world simply does look very dif ferent as seen f r o m dif fer-
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ent societies a n d at dif ferent times, is an ambiguous but incontestable/art of m o d e r n experience. What is not clear is precisely what
epistemic force and ethical significance there is good reason to
attribute to this fact. In its face, for example, does the idea of a
genuinely cosmopolitan point of view, tenable at a particular
point in time, even make sense? O r is this idea a phantasm, a
vanishing conceptual after-image of a m o d e of understanding
which is disintegrating before o u r very eyes?
If we thought of a cosmopolitan sense of history as being necessarily shaped, like any other h u m a n sense of history, within a
geocultural vision, a representation of h u m a n life f r o m a distinct
position in space and in terms of a particular linguistic and social
tradition, what geocultural vision could possibly serve the purpose? T h e r e is an anodyne answer to this question which certainly
has something to it: that a cosmopolitan geocultural vision is one
which incorporates the merits or benefits of all the distinct geocultural visions which make u p the present h u m a n community. But
this answer also is a little too glib to be valid; and it notably fails to
address the issue of which linguistic and social traditions can serve
to exemplif y this cosmopolitan point of view at its culturally most
commanding. (Once, the language of cosmopolitan understanding might have been, for example, Chinese or Mongol, Greek or
Egyptian, Arabic or Latin, French or American or Russian or
even Esperanto. But what exactly might we reasonably suppose it
to be today?) T h e idea of a geocultural vision evokes a visual
metaphor: h u m a n history seen from a particular set of m a p coordinates. And this visual m e t a p h o r in its turn suggests a comfortable additivity to the contents of the cosmopolitan point of view:
h u m a n history seen f r o m all the sets of m a p coordinates in the
now inhabited globe, taken together. T h e need to add is a p p a r e n t
enough. What is less clear, perhaps, is the conceptual possibility of
simply adding viewpoints. Are viewpoints in any sense entities
which can be added to one another? T h e need to add merely
reflects the liberal truism that all h u m a n societies have always
possessed and will, as long as h u m a n history continues to occur,
always continue to possess, their own experiential and existentially actual truth. Whatever precisely does make h u m a n history,
all h u m a n beings have their own history and nothing ever discovered in Paris or Washington or Moscow or Riyadh about what does
make h u m a n history can remove their experience f r o m the
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centre of this history which is truly theirs. But what this liberal
truism implies is not the availability in principle of a cosmopolitan
geocultural perspective but only the inevitability in practice of
more parochial geocultural perspectives.
And if for a m o m e n t we shift attention away f r o m the purely
visual m e t a p h o r and think instead of geocultural perspectives as
conceptions of the world (more or less theoretically integrated
complexes of belief's and sentiments) which h u m a n beings happen to inhabit (within which they must actively live) the prospects
f o r additivity look a good deal more forlorn. For in the encounter
between h u m a n cultures or geocultural perspectives it is necessary to consider the efficacy of a culture in two very different
dimensions: in terms of its powers of cognitive incorporation and
in terms of its capacity to maintain identity. In the real political
and economic ecology of the m o d e r n world, of course, these
dimensions are linked casually with one another, as they have
been for many millennia in the past. But neither is simply reducible to the other; and we are beginning at last, t h r o u g h the work of
thinkers like Habermas and Maclntyre, Taylor and Richard
Rorty, to recognize that the fantasy of subordinating the maintenance of identity to cognitive incorporation has been linked intimately with one of the deepest antinomies of western reason. T h e
antinomy in question is that between ethical richness and epistemic parsimony, an antinomy central to the Englightenment
project of interpreting nature univocally and authoritatively as
norm for h u m a n culture and thus for h u m a n social and political
organization as a whole. T h e pragmatist tinge of m o d e r n Western
philosophy of natural science, following in particular Quine, encourages us to think of the dimension of capacity for cognitive
incorporation as objective and relatively stable, if ontologically
elusive. Man's capacity to explain, predict and control nonh u m a n nature (and even the less obtrusively h u m a n bits of
h u m a n nature) has increased and is increasing. Short of Armageddon, it makes little sense practically or morally to expect or
hope that it will come deliberately to be diminished. T h e political
and economic organization and the cultures of different societies
today foster the development of this capacity to very varying
degrees. Skill at explaining, predicting and controlling nature is
extremely useful; and it is therefore hard, other things being
equal, not to see superior capacities for scientific learning as an
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unequivocal h u m a n good and societies which possess these
capacities as objectively preferable to those which manifestly lack
them. But no culture can live by explaining, predicting and controlling nature alone. And because of the tangled history of the
world which we inhabit, over the last f o u r centuries, for the great
majority of societies today the experience of acquiring a superior
understanding of n o n - h u m a n nature is inextricably entangled
with the experience of western domination and the d e e p political
bemusements of the struggle to escape f r o m this domination.
Cultural modification within this era has been for most societies is
the world a confusing melange of cultural e n h a n c e m e n t with
cultural destruction, a process of subjugation as much as one of
edification. It has left them today understandably unready to
trust others to distinguish for them and resentfully diffident of
their capacity to j u d g e for themselves how much of their present
identities, collectively and individually, to embrace as enhancement and how much to repudiate as destruction. But, by the same
token, the post-Quinean stress on the gap between the pragmatic
authority of natural scientific u n d e r s t a n d i n g and the epistemic
precariousness a n d vacuousness of any understanding of distinctively h u m a n qualities and characteristics has made it far easier
for us in the West to grasp the continuity between the cultural
predicament of most non-western peoples and that of ourselves.
For us, too, the culture of m o d e r n natural science and its elaborate and opaque linkages with the economic and political organization of the societies in which we live has been a product not
merely of a real history of productive organization and class
power but also of a complex cultural struggle. As long as it
remained natural for us to represent this process as the selfunfolding of reason, the history of this cultural struggle could
only appear to us as one of more or less linear cognitive progress
and we could see ourselves only as the p r o u d products of this
progress. But once the progress itself, identified in its own most
rigorous and parsimonious terms, has come to dictate an aband o n m e n t of any coherently realisable conception of h u m a n identity and any conception of how it can make sense to live a h u m a n
life, the dialectics of cultural e n h a n c e m e n t and destruction have
come home to roost with a vengeance. It would be fair to say that
thus far we have had little success in thinking t h r o u g h the implications of seeing ourselves as credal victims as well as beneficiaries
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of history. Alasdair Mac In tyre's A/ifer Virtue, Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and the less invigorating but more
extensive and systematic corpus of Habermas's writings have
been far more successful in conveying the scale of the imaginative
transformation which we are facing than they have in bringing
the questions at issue u n d e r disciplined intellectual control. What
they offer is more the prelude to a shift in sensibility than a deep
understanding of what exactly history has d o n e to o u r conceptions of nature and of o u r place within it.
But the broad drift of pragmatism, at least, is plain enough. It
enjoins us brusquely to see the relation between h u m a n u n d e r standing and nature as external and objective and its consequences as the development of real powers. And by contrast it
encourages us, though perhaps in a less peremptory fashion, to
see the relation between h u m a n understanding and h u m a n lives
and h u m a n societies as internal and equivocal and its consequences as little more than the persisting availability of idioms of
self-deception. T o resist this broad drift it is necessary either to
deny the metaphysical autonomy of purely epistemic considerations or (perhaps more promisingly) to see the c r u d e disjunction between fact and value as a product not of purely epistemic
considerations but rather of a naively conceived evaluative choice,
the choice to privilege considerations of practical control of the
n o n - h u m a n over those of h u m a n self-understanding and selfdevelopment. If either or both of these lines of thinking can be
carried through to good effect, they will not merely enable us to
get a better h u m a n grip on what history has m a d e of us. They will
also, plainly, alter the theoretical terms of trade in the reproduction of m o d e r n cultures between their powers of cognitive incorporation and their capacity to maintain existentially viable h u m a n
identities. By the same token they will force us to conceive cultures in relation to each other not simply as complexes of abstract
propositions, the truth status of which can be compared, one by
one or en gros, but rather as complexes of theoretically related
belief and sentiment, in which many beliefs are not open to a
purely individual reconsideration precisely because of the h u m a n
significance attached to them. None of this, of course, implies that
cultural change might come to an end or the cultural component
of h u m a n history be r e n d e r e d somehow existentially painless.
But it certainly does imply that the structures of historical percep-
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tion and belief set out in categories like modernization or westernization are d u e for very p r o f o u n d reconsideration and that they
cannot simply be replaced, with the political signs reversed, by
those of imperialism, d e p e n d e n c e , h e g e m o n y a n d e t h n o ressentiment. (Ambivalence and ambiguity just are central to
h u m a n history.)
As the simple reversal of the political signs suggests, the
readiest m o d e of reconsideration involves no more than a shift in
explicit political allegiance. T o invoke the tones of T h o m a s Hobbes, dependency is little more than westernization or modernization misliked. T h e r e is a certain cosmopolitanism of perspective
induced by the very practical integration of the world economy,
the organizational procedures of multinational corporations, the
diplomatic routines of interstate relations and the communication patterns of IATA, the telex and the United Nations. Indeed
it may by now be correct to see this perspective as a real culture, a
genuinely inhabited geocultural perspective with its representatives in almost every land, though of course in a higher density in
some lands than in others. But the very direct and explicit links
between the bearers of this culture and the practical modalities of
overwhelmingly unequal control over nature and other h u m a n
beings preclude o u r seeing it simply as a complex of beliefs, a
m o d e of understanding the world, which has traded the fatherlands of its individual possessors for a common allegiance to the
interests of the world as a whole. T h e r e certainly are, f r o m the
collective point of view of the h u m a n race, interests of the world
as a whole and it might even be true that these interests are more
clearly and fully discerned within the ranks of the bearers of this
cosmopolitan culture (though I see little evidence thus far that
this is so—and it is worse than trusting to presume that it must be
so). But what in any case we definitely should not do is to equate
participation in the culture itself with either accurate understanding or d e e p commitment to the collective interests of the species
now or in the f u t u r e .
In its pristine versions the theory of modernization had a certain splendid e f f r o n t e r y to it. J u s t as, if you'll forgive me, J o h n
Locke observed that in the beginning all the world was America, it
presumed blandly that in the end all the world must become so or
if, less optimistically, it seemed unlikely to contrive to do so, that
what this failure implied was its regrettable deviation f r o m the
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highest historical standards. Today we are on the whole more
cautious. We may have few reservations about natural science as
the abstract and teleological project of u n d e r s t a n d i n g nature—
and only moral and political reservations about it as the decidedly
more concrete project of enhancing men's capacity to control
nature. But we recognize a measure of precariousness in any
equation of the cultural preconditions for the flourishing of the
former with the advance of western culture and the corresponding retreat of non-western cultures. And we are for the most part
considerably less sanguine than we used to be about the connections between the epistemic and practical prowess, for better or
worse, of m o d e r n science, m o d e r n i n d u s t r y a n d m o d e r n
weaponry, and the more cherished aspects of o u r political and
social a r r a n g e m e n t s . T h i n k e r s as d i f f e r e n t as P o p p e r a n d
Habermas, of course, have attempted to show a necessary link
between the pursuit of science and ef fective social freedoms. But
the connections which plainly do exist are too weak and too
intricate (too fiddly) to enforce the r e c o m m e n d e d disciplines
u p o n political authority. Natural science, in the form in which
they fully recognize a need to acquire it, is readily available to even
the most tyrannical of m o d e r n rulers, as Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union have ascertained to themselves. If such regimes can
only produce more ef fectively, or learn more imaginatively, at the
price of surrendering many tyrannical powers, they can usually
af ford in practice to continue to produce less ef fectively and learn
less imaginatively; and even if, on rare occasions, they prove in
practice to be unable to af ford to do so, they are virtually certain to
misjudge this danger until it is too late to avert it. T h e only liberal
triumphs, f r o m this point of view, in m o d e r n history have been
the reconstruction of West Germany and J a p a n in the a f t e r m a t h
of the Second World War—and, dramatically important though
each of these episodes has certainly proved, it is a p p a r e n t enough
that the political capacity to r e n d e r them possible did not at the
time lie within the resources of these societies themselves.
Modernization and westernization, seen f r o m other quarters of
the globe, were modalities of western dominance, with the politics
discreetly edited out. What they reflected was the assurance of the
West that, whatever happens, we have got not merely the Maxim
gun but also western science and rationality—and they have
n o t — t h o u g h now, to be sure, they certainly could acquire
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these—and indeed would do so soon e n o u g h if only they would
take o u r advice, adopt o u r models and generally smarten up.
Modernization was quintessentially a mission civilisatrice and the
civilization into which the barbarians were to be inducted was, of
course, o u r own.
Some balance can be brought (and has by now been brought) to
all this, simply by restoring the politics to the text. Western
economic aid and western educational assistance are merely
masks—and often pretty indiscreet masks—for the economic and
political hegemony of the West. T h e westernized elites of the
T h i r d World are carefully cultivated quislings. And so on. But
restoring the politics by itself fails to resolve the ambiguities of
cultural confrontation. For the vagaries of the tradition of
capitalist modernization are fully matched in the tradition of
socialist modernization. T h e canonical texts of the latter also
confidently presume that the more advanced societies (themselves) simply display to the less the image of their own f uture.
And although the tradition of socialist modernization has become
by now (like its capitalist counterpart) a rather plural tradition,
both its Russian and its Chinese variants have proved at least as
rigid as the United States or Great Britain in their sense of the
institutional forms which it is appropriate for societies today to
employ. This has been as a p p a r e n t in Tibet as it has in Poland or
Central Asia and it has caused immense damage and resentment
in a wide variety of settings. Traditions of political legitimacy are
perhaps in general peculiarly rigid and maladapted to cultural
transplantation. Certainly, their equation with unequivocal cultural enhancement tends to involve fairly massive bad faith on the
part of both cultural donors and cultural recipients. Seen f r o m
Prague or Warsaw or Kabul, let alone f r o m Gdansk or Lhasa or
the H i n d u Kush, the extension of scientific socialism has proved
both culturally and politically at least as ambiguous an experience
as the combined ministrations of the IMF, the World Bank and
the CIA. Since, in this audience, I am no doubt on this text
preaching largely to the converted, I will not labour the point
f u r t h e r . Instead, I will simply underline in conclusion the grotesque absurdity of equating the major triumphs of a civilization's
theoretical understanding with the full panoply of its practical
social, political and economic institutions. What has science in the
end to do with the Russian or American states a n d the power
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which each of them disposes? T h e r e is nothing manifestly very
scientific about Mr. Brezhnev. But the same goes in spades for
Mr. Reagan.
All this, to be sure, is fairly limply negative. T o be incorporated
into the civilizational ambit of any of the major world powers is no
more necessarily to be d o n e a favour than to be incorporated into
their economic, political or military hegemonies. But what exactly
does this imply, apart f r o m a certain weary (and wary) scepticism?
Should we interpret it, for example, as dictating a comprehensive
credal relativism in relation to all cultures, a conception considerably more elusive than it may initially sound? Is the truth of
cultural interchange for the denizens of every culture all of (and
only) how that interchange appears to each of them: so that the
credal modification of cultures by each other in mutual interaction is to be seen validly only as subjectively credally benign
(because all beliefs are taken as true in and for themselves), while
externally and objectively it must be r e g a r d e d in purely causal
terms as a relation of force in which the issue of intrinsic validity
cannot in principle arise? Any attempt to think consistently in
these terms rapidly degenerates into paradox; and the intellectual devices required to sustain it seem arbitrary, tendentious and
insincere. But any other terms, because they presume the possibility and conceptual legitimacy of cultural critique, d e m a n d at least
an implicit conception of a normative culture within which the
criterion of epistemic validity can be established without arbitrariness, and by the standards of which other cultures can validly be
j u d g e d and f o u n d wanting. Vindicating the very possibility of
such a culture is, as some m e n have been more or less dimly aware
ever since Plato, philosophically a very tall o r d e r . O n the other
hand, the belief which Richard Rorty, if I understand him correctly, has now espoused—that the very conception of such a
culture is incoherent—seems, to me at least, a decidedly taller
order, indeed a veritable philosophical Tower of Babel which
sjtands no chance whatever of proving stable. Rorty's fetching
mockery of the view that philosophy and science are aptly seen as
more or less visually perfect mirrors of nature or that, since
philosophy and science in fact consist of propositions, they seek to
describe nature in the terms which it itself intrinsically demands,
is extremely seductive. But his conception of the interchange
between cultures as just the intersection of discrete h u m a n prac-
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tices is altogether too trusting of the theoretical coherence of most
h u m a n practice. T h e r e is more to cultural interchange—more
risk, more promise and more glory—than the mutual edification
which Rorty commends (which I take to mean simply an extension of the habit of patiently hearing one another out).
But although I am thus myself more or less helplessly committed to the presumption that at least the conception of such a culture
makes sense, and although I am old-fashioned enough to regard
the role of philosophy as precisely the attempt to delineate its
contours (with whatever degree of indeterminacy proves epistemically mandatory), I am not either vain or i m p r u d e n t enough to
try to o f f e r you a hasty sketch of it myself . Instead I shall t u r n
shortly to consider a more tractable theme, the politics of Ghana.
But before I do so I want to underline one obvious but important
implication of my a r g u m e n t so far for the relation between
geocultural perspective and identity. T h e point is this. Whether
we take the radically relativist view which I have repudiated or the
suspiciously Platonic view which I am somewhat surreptitiously
embracing, whether we locate it within the political ambience of
the more or less liberal West or in that of the less or more socialist
East, the very conception of a genuinely cosmopolitan perspective
on the world today stands in an internal relation to the cultural
history of the West and in severely external relations to the
cultural history of most of the rest of the world. Of course the
internal relation, as the range of possible allegiances I have already invoked makes clear, may have involved a good many
dialectical twists and turns. But it does remain—and in a question
of identity this is the vital consideration—an internal relation.
T h e most that can be hoped in this instance is that it may prove
possible through time to blur a little the severity of this contrast,
partly by highlighing more generously and imaginatively the
drastically and painfully dialectical character of western cultural
history and partly by r e n d e r i n g the process of incorporation into
categories (which at least originate with the West) more seductive
and less abrasive than it has so far proved. Even to hope for this is
to hope for far more than we are likely to be given.
I want now to consider the implications of these painful questions on a far narrower stage, the f o r m e r British colonial territory
of the Gold Coast, now the state of Ghana. Today, sadly, the
importance of Ghana for such questions is confined to the purely
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exemplary. But only a quarter of a century ago, when Ghana
became an independent state, matters were very different. U n d e r
the dazzling political leadership of Kwame N k r u m a h , the Gold
Coast set the fashion for British decolonization in the African
continent as a whole and the populist nationalism of the party
which N k r u m a h f o u n d e d , the Convention People's Party or CPP,
presented its colonial rulers with a challenge which they were
quite unready to meet. Ghana was the first African country to
have its capacity for a stable and effective m o d e r n political o r d e r
vetted at length by an American political scientist, an assessment
as it proved of a broadly optimistic character, already made public
two years before the date of formal independence. For a time
N k r u m a h ' s formidable personal charm united colonial officials,
Soviet diplomats, American political scientists and the political
leadership of o t h e r African countries in admiration of his
achievements. It was a time of euphoria. Outside the country,
also, he contrived to use the great prestige earned by his historical
priority in the nationalist struggle to help crucially in forming the
main African diplomatic grouping, the Organization of African
Unity. U n d e r N k r u m a h , briefly, Ghana, a little West African state
of no particular importance, became a political cynosure for the
world as a whole. It was a formidable feat of political illusionism.
But it was, of course, also far too good to last. By the time in
February 1966 that N k r u m a h was removed f r o m of fice by a small
scale military coup, the glamour of independence had faded
miserably. His dramatic historical role had t u r n e d N k r u m a h ' s
head. (Characteristically, the occasion of his fall f o u n d him on the
other side of the globe in Peking on a self-initiated mission to end
the Vietnam war). Even within the African continent his position
had become hopelessly compromised by vanity and by the sponsorship of subversion amongst his neighbours, leaving a continental policy shrunk to the dimensions of Panafricanism in one
country. Domestically, he left a drastically weakened economy
and a people resentful of the food shortages, corruption and
bullying which marked the closing stages of his rule. More importantly perhaps, he left a population which was profoundly bemused by its political experiences, but which retained a fair degree of optimism about its prospects for the f u t u r e .
Today no one in Ghana has much optimism about the f uture.
Virtually all Ghanaians who can readily do so have voted with
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their feet and left the country to employ their marketable skills
and qualifications elsewhere. Inflation soars. Foreign trade has
virtually collapsed and the food supplies to major centres of
population are erratic and grossly insufficient. T h e country's
main export production, cocoa farming, has been devastated by
decades of gross over-taxation. T h e government is in the hands of
a poorly organized and politically and economically ignorant
g r o u p of j u n i o r officers and NCOs, the fifth or sixth distinct
military regime since J a n u a r y 1966. Any economic policy which
might conceivably arrest the steady disintegration of the economy
would be politically prohibitive, since it would necessarily involve
the f u r t h e r depletion in the short term of standards of consumption which are already dismally low, particularly in the cities and
towns, where the government are politically most vulnerable. T h e
last government which had the nerve to attempt anything of the
sort, the Progress Party government of Dr. Busia, was summarily
removed f r o m office by the soldiery roughly ten years ago. At one
level, no doubt, matters could be (and very probably will be)
considerably worse. T h e levels of anomic violence f r o m the
a r m e d forces are thus far much less alarming than those of
Uganda today, let alone u n d e r General Amin. T h e r e have thus
far been no instances of inter-tribal massacre involving the armed
forces and the country has yet to vindicate the suspicion that it
may be a structural property of postcolonial states in Africa that
they occasionally shoot a tribe pour encourager les autres. In Ghana
so far the rivers have not r u n red with blood and the polity has not
regressed to the nightmare world of Equatorial Guinea a few
years ago or even to that of Sekou T o u r e ' s regime before he
relented and allowed it to be bailed out by the multinational
mining corporations. But the absence of such gross abominations
in a way simply underlines the scale of the catastrophe which has
taken place.
Twenty five years ago Ghana was the pride of Af rica. Fifteen
years ago, a little chastened but far f r o m bowed, it was an enormously warm and happy society, full of absurd inequalities and
irrationalities like all actual societies, but still pretty prosperous by
African standards, and still very much resided in by people most
of whom knew how to make many aspects of their lives entertaining and agreeable. Today everyday life for almost everyone is an
unrelenting misery. A whole way of life, settlement, transport,
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occupational structure, f o u n d e d on international exchange, has
been r e n d e r e d unworkable. Of course some things do still operate after a fashion. Letters are sometimes delivered and the soldiers still have bullets. But hospitals, in a country ravaged by
malaria, dysentery, river blindness, bilharzia and sleeping sickness, have neither drugs n o r syringes, even in the capital. Lorries
have no petrol. Food and cocoa rot in the forest. T h e soldiers have
no coherent idea of how to rule—-just the diffuse anger and
bitterness of their civilian compatriots. And no one any longer
knows how to stop them f r o m ruling whenever they feel like
trying their h a n d at it. Within less than a decade and a half a
happy and prosperous people have been reduced to misery simply by the way in which they have been misgoverned—and today
they have no realistic prospect of major improvements in their
position within an imaginable future. It is an awesome d e m o n stration of the destructive power of politics. But what exactly does
it mean?
I emphasize the scale of the ruin which has befallen the people
of Ghana to discourage the imaginative response that perhaps it
may not mean anything in particular or may mean only whatever
anyone at present chooses to regard it as meaning. Ghanaians, of
course, like any other assemblage of millions of people subjected
to overwhelming disaster, vary considerably in their understanding of what it does mean. Since they have had to live t h r o u g h it,
none of their sincerely experienced understandings can simply be
discounted as irrelevant. But thus far at any rate it is clear that
even when laid together side by side the collective understandings
of the Ghanaian people can as yet make very little sense out of the
disaster which has befallen them. Perhaps in some parts of the
country, in 1954 and 1956, and rather more widely in 1969, there
could be said to have been a distinctively Ghanaian understanding of the content of Ghanaian politics, a tribalist understanding
if you will, centering on the political recrudescence of the Ashanti
nation, or, later, of the Akan peoples as a whole. And everywhere
in Ghana, as in other societies, there are distinct localist perspectives on the exercise of power by the central state. Certainly also,
every contested national election since 1954 has been f o u g h t
predominantly between two national political parties, one of
which conceives itself as the legitimate heir of N k r u m a h ' s Convention People's Party and the other of which sees itself as the
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lineal descendant of its inveterate foe, the United Party or Progress Party of Dr. Busia. These traditions of political conflict are
often extraordinarily intricate at a local level and they have seldom been uncomplicated even in the alignment of national political forces. But even today they still represent for many a certain
sense of national political allegiance t h r o u g h time. What they do
not offer, however, is any coherent diagnosis of the nature and
causation of the catastrophe which has struck Ghana. For such a
diagnosis, thus far at least, an external perspective on the political
vicissitudes of the country does appear to be a prerequisite. And
any such external viewpoint is necessarily subject not merely to
the presumption of a certain degree of ignorance but also—and
more crucially—to the suspicion of a measure of parti pris associated with more or less self-conscious local commitments of its
own elsewhere. What has taken place in Ghana over the last three
decades is not some ghastly and determinate act of gratuitous
criminality, like the Holocaust or the monstrous Khmer Rouge
obliteration of old Cambodia. But it is unmistakably for those
involved a tragedy; and just because it has not been a determinate
and virtually self-interpreting intentional performance, it can
only be understood validly by grasping an intricate and opaque
causality. In this sense the idea of a cosmopolitan standpoint on
the history of m o d e r n Ghana is not an assault on Ghanaian
identity or a self-regarding celebration of the incomparable advantages, cognitive as well as existential, of living in what at
present are still happier lands. All it represents is the presumption of the availability in principle of a f o r m of understanding
which the people of Ghana direly need, which they have so far
proved unable to muster out of their own resources and which it is
open to others today at least to attempt to fashion because of just
those aspects of the economic and practical integration of the
world today which first enabled Ghana to become a contented
and prosperous independent state as a single unit and then enabled it to plunge to its ruin.
O n e desideratum of a genuinely cosmopolitan understanding
is that it should not gratuitously flatter the historical roles of any
political actors, Ghanaian or foreign, within this disastrous political trajectory. T h e r e has certainly been in abundance over these
years, in Ghanaian domestic politics and in the interventions of
foreign powers, obtuseness, greed, cowardice and malice, as there
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is in the politics of every land. No foreign power (Britain, Russia,
America) which has played a major role in shaping the country's
f u t u r e at any point in the last f o u r decades has much on which to
congratulate itself. But by the same token no political force within
Ghanaian society itself since the early 1950s has much to be p r o u d
of either. T h e records of public theft, economic incompetence
and private squalor of each Ghanaian regime in this period has
been dismal in every instance in its arrogance and irresponsibility.
Some, to be sure, have d o n e far more damage than others; most
importantly, perhaps, General Acheampong, the leader of the
coup which overthrew the Progress Party government in 1972,
who was duly shot u n d e r the brief first government of Flight
Lieutenant Rawlings. But none has shown any sign of taking the
measure of the political and economic problems which c o n f r o n t
the country and of establishing much practical control over these.
This has not been a question of ideological proclivity which has
varied all the way f r o m the dedicated ideologues of scientific
socialism on the left of Nkrumah's administration to firm exponents, within the Progress Party, of the view that the Ghanaian
state precisely ought to be the executive committee of the
Ghanaian bourgeoisie and that the only real criticism which it
richly merited was that of failing abjectly to exert its powers
effectively on behalf of what should long have been an indigenous
ruling class. What Ghana has not been o f f e r e d politically at any
point since 1951 is the combination of a clear understanding of
the country's political economy and a feeling for the internal
political dynamics of mustering and sustaining popular support
for economic policies which might, in the light of this political
economy, actually work in practice. Of course one could say the
same of other countries. (The United Kingdom comes to mind.)
But, in the case of Ghana at least, the crucial f actor which has been
absent and which has prevented any such outcome has not been
the will or the political flexibility but the crude understanding of
the economic and political factors involved. T h e r e can be no
rational doubt that Ghana has over the last three decades been
grotesquely misgoverned. And it follows f r o m this characterization, presuming it to be valid, that the present devastation of the
economy and, hence, of the life chances of its population is not
something attributable to the structural malignity of the world
economy but is rather the responsibility of a particular set of
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h u m a n beings—the political leaders of the country over this
period of time.
O n e can sharpen this point by a relatively simple comparison
between the debacle of the Ghanaian economy over the last
twenty years and the f airly massive gains in material welf are made
in the, in most respects, structurally and ecologically analogous
territory of the Ivory Coast next door. T h e Ivory Coast f r o m most
points of view is still administered economically very much as it
would have been if it had remained a French colony. French
companies dominate its economy's international exchanges and
the m o d e r n sector of its domestic production. French civil servants and technical experts retain overwhelming influence over
its economic strategy and French soldiers furnish a modest but
thus far sufficient praetorian guard for its now aging President,
H o u p h o u e t Boigny, a ministerial veteran of the French Fourth
Republic. (The crucial importance of this last consideration is
u n d e r l i n e d by the massive a n d erratic contribution of the
Ghanaian armed forces to their country's present plight). T h e r e
are, of course, many grounds for criticizing the development of
the Ivoirien economy, quite apart f r o m the consideration that its
development has been achieved by a tacit perpetuation of many
aspects of colonial rule. But what it definitely does show is that the
destruction of the Ghanaian economy is predominantly a domestic political achievement, not a geographical or historical fatality.
This h u m a n failure, sadly, has not been narrowly distributed
within the society. All major political forces with any definition
a n d capacity for agency in the society have by now played their
part. Both major political parties have been tried and f o u n d
grossly wanting, N k r u m a h ' s party by now on two separate occasions. T h e a r m e d services likewise have been tried at least twice
already, doing wholly gratuitous and inexcusable damage by their
last protracted venture, and the blood runs cold at the thought of
the harm which they may be now about to perpetrate. As in the
case of the United Kingdom over the last two decades, such
singular consistency in political failure cannot be explained simply by the fecklessness of political leaders. Since they have the
moral nerve to o f f e r their services as rulers professional politicians and the makers of military coups certainly bear responsibility for the consequences of their political performance. But consistently disastrous outcomes of the exercise of governmental
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power are most unlikely to be caused by nothing more complicated than the monumental bad luck over the political j u d g m e n t
of the governors.
What is it about Ghanaian society and polity which has elicited
such a dismal display of vice and ineptitude f r o m those who have
ruled over it since the mid-1950s? This is, plainly, a very complex
historical question. But it can be answered in bold outline with
considerable confidence. What made Ghana at its independence
in 1957 the most prosperous and probably the most equitably
prosperous country in Sub-Saharan Africa, north of the indubitably less equitable Union of South Africa was certainly not the
entrepreneurial vigour of British capital, still less that of its colonial rulers. Instead it was the energy and inventiveness with which
the Akan, Krobo, and Ewe farmers of the southern Gold Coast
developed its rain forest into the premier cocoa-growing zone in
the world, making the Gold Coast at Independence the p r o d u c e r
of u p to half the entire world stock of cocoa. By the same token,
what has ruined Ghana since has been the diversion, t h r o u g h a
government monopsony, of a staggeringly high proportion of the
wealth created by Ghana's cocoa farmers into a range of almost
universally disastrous public sector entrepreneurial ventures and
the maintenance of a huge, relatively highly paid and predominantly parasitic bureaucracy.
Now in diverting these resources in this way it was certainly not
the intention of Ghana's rulers to liquidate the cocoa-producing
sector of the economy or to fritter away hard won wealth on costly
factories which failed to produce for markets which didn't exist.
What they hoped, naturally enough, and for a time in consonance
with bien pensant western economists, was to diversify a n d
strengthen the productive base of the economy t h r o u g h a prog r a m m e of import-substitutive industrialization. This was an
over-optimistic but far f r o m absurd strategy in itself. What has
made it lethal for Ghana was the array of forces which caused the
Ghanaian state to implement it so fecklessly. H e r e the key contrast was with the colonial regime. What made the colonial state a
more benign administrative agency for the Ghanaian economy
than N k r u m a h and most if not all of his successors, was not, of
course, a greater dedication to the real interests of Ghanaians, a
possibility too ludicrous to merit serious discussion. Rather, it was
the very effective constraint placed upon all British colonial ad-
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ministrations t h r o u g h o u t far the greater part of their existence to
restrict their expenditure to their own fiscal capabilities and to
limit their fiscal extraction in t u r n to a rate which did not impair
the f u t u r e productivity (and thus the f u t u r e fiscal yield) of the
economy which they administered. Oddly the British colonial
state was effectively disciplined, as the m o r e c r e d u l o u s l y
functionalist Marxist fancy presumes all states to be, to reproduce
the social relations of production and hence to sustain the productivity of the economy. But the post-colonial state of Ghana was
u n d e r no such discipline. Unlike the colonial administration
which was firmly answerable to the metropolis, the independent
state of Ghana was effectively answerable to no one at all, either
inside or outside the country. Its constructive powers were pretty
limited but its capacity to destroy was impressive. And so far f r o m
discharging its theoretically allotted role of reproducing the
m o d e of production, it has come by now extremely close to obliterating this. It has done so, of course, because it furnished real
opportunities to real men and women and because some of these
opportunities were taken with enthusiasm—making first civilian
politics and then career soldiering into the grandest entrepreneurial horizons within the society. It was able to do so because
of the devastating ef ficacy as a taxing device of a colonial institution, the Cocoa Marketing Board, the sort of instrument of which
absolutist monarchs dreamed. But it chose to do so because,
unlike the colonial administrators, it was not externally inhibited
f r o m doing so, because it simply did notunderstand the disciplines
of production and because initially it won friends and influenced
people by spending the proceeds and because by the time that it
could no longer hope to do this, it was wholly beyond its power to
repair the damage. Apres moi le deluge is one of the most oecumenically accessible of political mottoes.
And today the flood has come with a vengeance.
If the Ghanaians are to stand any chance of recovering from its
impact they will need to grasp first what it is that has befallen
them. But to do this they will have to learn to see the politics of
their country in terms which are as yet very far f r o m being their
own. I want therefore to turn back briefly f r o m the fate of Ghana
to reconsider in more chastened terms the issue of the legitimacy
of a critique of culture.
What is the moral which I seek to draw f r o m all this? What is a
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cosmpolitan perspective on the sorry recent history of Ghana and
how does it relate to the troubling categories of modernity, identity and the claim to a superior understanding? It is a perspective,
above all, I think, which registers the ineradicable significance for
every h u m a n individual and society of their own sense of their
own existence. It is also one which acknowledges the inescapable
and always potentially tragic conflicts which follow f r o m this
significance, between distinct values for each particular individual or society and the equally tragic conflicts between the entire
scheme of values of one individual and that of another and the
potentially more overwhelming and finally tragic conflicts between the scheme of values of one society or set of societies and
another. (Consider the Falkland Islands.) But equally, I think, it
must recognize not only the rational commitment of highly contingent h u m a n beings to the values which they simply h a p p e n to
value, but also the overwhelming causal importance in the shaping of individual and social life not just of momentary imprudence, folly, greed and ressentiment, but also of p r o f o u n d failures to grasp what is actually occurring to h u m a n beings and what
this will mean for the values they hold dear. Men make their own
history, u n d e r conditions notoriously not of their own choosing.
But they understand very poorly what it is that they are doing in
making it as they choose. It is this p r o f o u n d incomprehension
and the d r e a d f u l consequences which sometimes follow f r o m it
that a cosmopolitan perspective must try to alleviate. It is not a
view from somewhere in particular but a view of something in
particular. In this sense certainly it has no option but to claim to
know better than the parochial visions with which it contrasts
itself . But what it claims to know better is not what other h u m a n
beings in a particular place should choose to value and to become,
but rather of how they have good reason to act to protect more
effectively and realize more fully the values which truly are theirs.
What it seeks to do is not to supplant the values of real people a n d
localities with those esteemed by Professor Habermas, but to aid
their bearers to perceive more clearly the dangers which face
their values and the opportunities which they enjoy to secure
these values against such dangers.
What particular h u m a n beings actually value, however little
their values may appeal to us, is not adequately seen as a set of
evaluative propositions or a collection of affective states, the ap-
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propriate materials for a World H a n d b o o k of Cultural and
Psychic Indicators. What h u m a n values are, rather, are the
categories which in part determine and are in part e n g e n d e r e d by
the repressions and ef forts, the hopes and terrors of a lifetime. If
we recognize their force for others, as we cannot but recognize
their force for ourselves and if, accordingly, we will the end of
enabling others to d e f e n d their own values, we must also, other
things being equal, will the means. In the case of politics this
certainly raises gross questions of economic redistribution. But in
the particular context which I have been considering, what it
principally and unequivocally implies is the commitment to will a
change in the false causal beliefs which have made the Ghanaian
people, within their political forms of the last three decades, their
own most mortal enemies and the agents of destruction of their
own most deeply felt concerns.
T h e key point, with which 1 wish to close, is simply this. T o
respect the values of another h u m a n being or an alien society does
not entail a respect for the causal beliefs of that person or society.
Indeed, as I have tried to show, it precisely precludes respect for
causal beliefs of real practical importance which one has good
reason to believe false. T h e 'cosmopolitan' claim to know better,
where it is legitimately advanced, is not a claim to know better
what others should be. It is the claim to a better understanding of
some of the practical preconditions for realizing and protecting
what others in fact are and choose to remain. In a world practically interrelated in economic, political and cultural ways like the
world in which we all live today, we are all, after o u r capacities,
credal fellow citizens of a common territory, the present h u m a n
habitat. It is a status which for some of us certainly has its charms
and its privileges. But like any civic status it also has its duties.
So for this common territory and all those who perforce share it
I o f f e r another, I trust equally oecumenical and somewhat more
edifying political motto: Sains populi suprema lex*
University of Cambridge
*For the analysis of recent Ghanaian history which lies behind
the j u d g m e n t s of the lecture see Introduction and Conclusion to
J o h n D u n n (ed), West African States: Failure and Promise, Cambridge University Press, C a m b r i d g e 1978, J . D u n n & A. F.
Robertson, Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo,
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Cambridge University Press, 1973, and J. D u n n , Political Obligation in its Historical Context, Cambridge University Press 1980. For
the broader conceptions of history and h u m a n value which shape
the a r g u m e n t as a whole see J. Dunn, Modern Revolutions, Cambridge University Press, 1972; Western Political Theory in the Face of
the Future, Cambridge University Press, 1979 and Political Obligation in its Historical Context, chapters 5 and 10.
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